Тhe Janus-faced abductive inference
| dc.contributor.author | Mineva, Martina | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2024-10-01T19:18:21Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2024-10-01T19:18:21Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2024-09-01 | |
| dc.description.abstract | The text offers an analysis of the problem of the abductive inference’s internal limits, attempting to extract the theoretical charge of the metaphor about Janus-faced abduction, offered by John Kaag. This problem is put into consideration through Charles Peirce's dual definition of abduction simultaneously as both a process of forming explanatory hypotheses and the only logicaloperation that presents new ideas. It is emphasized that: by going through 1) taking into account the praxeological turn in logic (20th century); 2) making sense of an analogous metaphor in Ernest Cassirer, which refers to symbolic forms; and 3) turning to an attempt to analyze Kepler's discovery of the shape of the orbit of Mars as the most emblematic example of abductive inference (as Peirce points out), it is possible to think the theoretical charge of the metaphor of the Janus-faced abduction. The results of the investigation are presented summarized with the highlighting of the following problems: 1) the modal conflict of the forbidden obligatory; 2) the weak incommensurability; and 3) the dynamics between forma formans and forma formata. | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 2534-8442 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://doi.uni-plovdiv.bg/handle/store/234 | |
| dc.language.iso | other | |
| dc.publisher | Plovdiv University Press | |
| dc.subject | abductive inference | |
| dc.subject | practical logic | |
| dc.subject | groundbreaking inference | |
| dc.subject | forbidden obligatory | |
| dc.subject | weak incommensurability | |
| dc.title | Тhe Janus-faced abductive inference | |
| dc.type | Article |